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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILFORD N. HANSEN and VADA J.
HANSEN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Supreme Court No. 19383
vs.

JOHN J. STEWART and ALICE E.K.
STEWART, husband and wife,
Defendants/Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF APPELLANTS
WILFORD N. HANSEN and VADA J. HANSEN

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Wilford and Vada
Hansen, the Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully petition the Utah Supreme Court for
rehearing of the above-entitled matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioners set forth, with particularity, the following points of facts and law
which Petitioners claim the Court has overlooked or misapprehended.
1.

While the location of a disputed boundary may often be a question of

both fact and law, in this case, there are only questions of law.
are in dispute.

None of the facts

The majority's description of appropriate roles of judge and jury

presupposes a determination that there are factual issues to be resolved by a jury and
that some evidence has been presented in support thereof.
are no disputes of relevant factual issues.

In the instant case, there

The only issue involves the application of

law to the undisputed facts.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

The facts do not support the verdict, factually or legally.

presented support only one conclusion: judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

The facts
If the facts

presented in this matter are clearly understood and are distinguished from the opinions
and conclusions proffered by the witnesses at trial, the Court will understand that
there is not even a scintilla of relevant factual evidence which supports Defendants'
i

position. What is in dispute in this case is the law.
3. Plaintiffs' appeal does not ask the Court to ignore its standards of review.
Plaintiffs have now comlied with the Court's standards of review.

Since the jurors
i

had no factual issues to weigh, the appellate court's determination will not be a
substitution for the decision of the jury. Because the facts do not support the verdict,
it cannot stand.
4. Even if Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions and their specific objections
made in chambers have not been preserved in the record, the Court may still, in its
discretion and in the interest of justice, review errors in instructions which have not
been properly preserved. Special circumstances warranting such a review occur in this

i

case because the jury instructions are legally insufficient and result in prejudice to the
plaintiff.
<

a.

The jury was asked to resolve an alleged factual dispute when there

was none.
b. The jury was instructed to weigh evidence which, by law, had already
<

been weighed.
c.

The jury was instructed to determine the credibility of witnesses

when credibility was not a relevant issue of fact.

Since there were no factual

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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disputes, this instruction resulted in their weighing the credibility of the witnesses'
arguments, opinions, and conclusions.
d. The burden of proof should have rested with defendants.
e.
judgment.

Plaintiffs and surrounding landowners are now burdened by a void

The judgment is void because, despite disclaimers of the trial judge, it

assumes jurisdiction over landowners who are not parties to this action, and will
require that they reform their deeds.
5.

Plaintiffs resubmit with this petition a marshalling of all the evidence.

None of it is in dispute and none of it supports the verdict as a matter of law. The
Supreme Court is entitled to overturn the jury verdict and enter judgment in favor of
the Plaintiffs as a matter of law i.e., to grant judgment notwithstanding the jury
verdict, or to order a new trial when there is manifest error or when the verdict is
not supported by substantial evidence, is against law, or is void.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

THIS TRIAL PRESENTED ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW.

The majority opinion issued on July 28, 1988 states (See par. 6):
The determination of the actual location of a disputed
boundary is often a compound issue which presents question
both of law and of fact. . . In any particular case, then,
where conflicting evidence of various types is presented,
some evidentiary conflicts may be resolved as matters of
law, while others may be decided as matters of fact. The
appropriate roles of judge and jury are preserved when the
judge instructs as the relative weight to be given each type
of evidence and the jury then determines the facts to which
those relative weights are to be assigned. See 12 Am. Jur.
2d Boundaries Section 116 (1964).
Although it may have been proper to empanel a jury at the beginning of this trial in
case there were to be disputes of fact presented, there were no conflicts that needed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be resolved as matters of fact.

The facts in this case consisted of undisputed

testimony regarding the visible location of boundary lines and fences, the undisputed
and unambiguous descriptions in the deeds of landowners in Lot 12, field measurements
which can be shown to be in agreement to within a few inches, various unofficial maps
and plats which were offered to show undisputed relative positions of various
properties, and the scaled dimensions derived therefrom.1 (See marshalled evidence in
appendix.)
75 Am. Jr. 2d Trial Section 328 states:
Before submitting a case to the jury, the judge must
determine whether the party who has the burden of proof
has produced any substantial evidence upon which the iurv
can properly render a verdict in favor of that party.
Having found that such evidence has been introduced, the
court cannot invade the function of the jury to determine
the facts, but must, when such evidence is conflicting, or
admits of different inferences, leave the case to the
determination of the jury.
In the instant case, the issue of the corner location was raised as part of defendants'
counterclaims.

The defendants, therefore, have the burden of proof.

The trial judge

should properly have determined 1) whether there was any substantial evidence upon
which the jury could properly render a verdict in defendants' favor, and 2) whether
such evidence was in dispute.

It should be remembered that "evidence" refers

exclusively to the facts and not to the opinions and conclusions presented at trial.
Such opinions, conclusions etc. may become confused with evidence in a juror's mind,

1

By way of note on this point, it was difficult at trial to see that the
measurements were not in dispute because Defendants' surveyor conducted his
measurements irregularly, ie. to points within the Block not recommended by good
surveying technique, so that his measurements must at times be added together to show
that his measurements agree with Plaintiffs' surveyors' measurements.
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but are not in themselves probative as factual issues.

Whether there are factual

questions may not be readily apparent at the beginning of trial, and may not be readily
apparent even at the close of the trial, as in this case. The fact that counsel or trial
judge may neglect to follow these determinations need not imply that factual issues
exist and support defendants' claims. If neither counsel nor the judge recognized that
there were no factual issues at trial, it constitutes manifest error to assume or to
determine erroneously that some must have existed. The principal trial question itself
which was submitted to the jury cannot itself be a factual issue if the underlying facts
are not at issue.

There were no issues of fact.

This being the case, this Court may

review the facts and so determine.
In the present case there are several reasons why the trial judge and the
opposing counsel (See Defendants' Brief at p.4) have passed over this argument without
reciting any fact which they claim was at issue.
a.

The evidence was technical.

b.

The surveyors' measurements were taken from different points and

need to be understood mathematically to recognize that they agree with each other to
within inches.
c.

The testimony of the witnesses was fraught with statements of

opinion about what the law on this question might reasonably be, and with unfounded
conclusions so that even though the underlying facts were in agreement, the testimony
appeared to be divergent and contradictory.
In spite of the trial court's reluctance to review the facts after trial and in
spite of Defendants' counsel's implications to the contrary in Defendants' Brief, the
truth of the matter is that there is no issue of fact.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,5J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The majority assumes that conflicting testimony necessarily implies conflicting
facts.

Testimony consists of relevant and irrelevant facts, founded and unfounded

conclusions or opinions.

The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.

Rather,

the witnesses' conclusions and opinions were in dispute.
POINT II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. THE FACTS
PRESENTED SUPPORT ONLY ONE CONCLUSION - PLAINTIFFS' POSITION.
Whether or not there were issues of fact presented at trial, the relevant facts
support only one conclusion, the position claimed by Plaintiffs.

In the present case, if

the testimony is reviewed carefully to separate the relevant facts from the claimed
conclusions, (a task that is sometimes difficult during the trial itself) it can be clearly
seen that there is not one scintilla of evidence to support Defendants' position. All of
the facts are in harmony and are supportive of only one position: locating the

{

northeast corner of Lot 12 at a coincident point with the northeast corner of Block 34
- Plaintiffs' location.

All of the boundaries, deeds, maps, plats and measurements are

in agreement. Not even the boundary between Plaintiffs and Defendants is factually at
issue.

{

Both parties stipulated that the only issue was the actual location of the

northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34. Plaintiffs marshalled all of the factual evidence
(see appendix) and have searched the record for a factual issue or for a fact which

{

can be viewed in a light supportive of Defendants' position and have found none. Only
testimony such as the following is seen (see Trans Vol III p. 99-100)
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. JENKINS:

<

Q
Mr. Hickman, I think your experience in surveying and abstracting stands
probably 40 years, correct?
A
Yes.
Q
In your experience and based upon your training do you have an opinion
as to what the impact would be, and I want a comparison, of using the Bott survey to
establish the northeast corner of Lot 12 as opposed to the Spires' survey?
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4

A
I would like to go into a little background. I'm concerned personally
about the impact of this whole trial because in my opinion it strikes right at the heart
of the American recording system which was established by William Bradford who was
the first governor of the Plymouth Colony who set up a recording system so that
documents could be put of record to establish for the public as a whole notice of
interest so that they could go there and determine the status of ownership of property.
If we at will change recorded maps and this type of thing, it seems to
me that there is going to be a great deal of impact, and now I'm getting to your
question.
What is to prevent us from changing any survey, any subdivision that is
recorded today through use, I'm not stating that ownership or possession cannot
change, because I don't deny that and it can be. What I'm saying is that the recorded
information should be there as a reference.
Now, it's a simple matter to change descriptions on individual deeds. We
do it everyday and the cost is minimal.
The thing that I don't like to see is a change of this nature because it
does not only affect this particular piece, but just in Logan and Hyrum and so forth
alone there are many, many blocks where this same thing has happened and this could
set a precedent for creating impact on those as well as this one.
Q
What does the Bott survey do?
A
Well, in my opinion all the Bott survey does is show the location of the
record and the possessory interest.
Q
What does the Spires' survey do?
A
It attempts to change that record location.
Q
Will the Bott survey adversely affect the ownership of property within
Lot 12? Are those people down the line going to be hurt?
A
Obviously it will, the two parcels involved here, but no, I can't see that
it will the others.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FILLMORE:
Q
The fact is other parties will be affected unless they agree to a
reformation of deeds, right?
A
Right.
The court committed reversible error when it allowed the
court appointed surveyor and another surveyor who had
surveyed the land in question to state their opinions as to
the true boundary line between plaintiff and each of the
defendants. . . .
Combs v. Woodie 53 NC App 789, 281 SE2d 705 (1981)
In the present case, it is clear that Defendants' object is to reject the
beginning point in spite of its clear harmony with all of the other relevant facts.
Defendants' statement (Transcript Vol 3 at p.33) that if their position is allowed to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stand, all of the deeds in the area will have to be reformed, is a clear statement of
their error.

It amounts to saying, "The facts as they now stand are in favor of

Plaintiffs survey point, and if Defendants' position is accepted, all of the facts will
have to be reformed to support it.H
As stated in 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 55 (1974):
In locating and running the boundary lines of lots or tracts
of land of private owners, reference is to be had to the
calls in the grant and to the field notes carried into the
grant or the map or plan with reference to which the
conveyance was made; and if there is no ambiguity the
land must be located and the lines run according to the
description of the conveyance. None of the calls should be
rejected or disregarded if thev can be harmonized and
applied in any reasonable manner...the real purpose of a
boundary inquiry is to follow the steps of the surveyor on
the ground, and all calls will be construed with this in
mind.
In short, there is not one scintilla of evidence, and not any fact in dispute,
which supports the location of the disputed corner at the location contended for by
Defendants.

It never has existed there, and would require the reformation of all of

the facts to put it where Defendants contend.
POINT III.

PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL DOES NOT ASK THE COURT TO

IGNORE ITS STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Plaintiffs' appeal accepts the standards of review established by the court for
examining jury instructions, for overturning a jury verdict, for granting a new trial or
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as shown in the sections below. Plaintiffs have
now complied with each of those standards.

8
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POINT IV.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT THE COURTS REVIEW

OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
The majority in this matter, citing Rule 51 U.R.C.P., E.A. STROUT WESTERN
REALTY AGENCY, INC. v. W.C.FOY & SONS, INC., 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983) and
CAMBELT INT'L CORP. v. DALTON, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987), have stated
Rule 51 does allow this Court Min its discretion and in the
interests of justice" to review errors in instructions which
have not been properly preserved.
However, "it is
incumbent upon the aggrieved party to present a persuasive
reason" for exercising that discretion, and this requires
"showing special circumstances warranting such a review."
The Strout case then suggests (p.1323) that special circumstances include those
instances where the court's instructions presented to the jury are legally insufficient
or result in prejudice to the party seeking relief.

As set forth in STATE v. KAZDA

545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976) there must also be a showing that there is a "substantial
likelihood that an injustice has resulted."
The majority in this matter states that Hansens have made no such showing.
However, Hansens clearly show that the jury instructions given are legally insufficient,
result in prejudice to them, and that injustice has occurred as follows:
A.
none.

The jury was asked to resolve an alleged factual dispute when there was

POWERS v. GENE'S BLDG MATERIALS, INC., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977) held:
Parties are entitled to have their theories of the case
presented to the jury in the form of instructions only if
they are supported by the evidence.

B. The jury was instructed to weigh evidence which, by law, had already been
weighed. 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 61 states:
In surveying a tract of land according to a former plat or
survey, the surveyor's only duty is to relocate, upon the
best evidence obtainable, the courses and lines at the same
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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place where originally located bv the first surveyor on the
ground...the rule is based on the premise that the stability
of boundary lines is more important than minor inaccuracies
or mistakes...A resurvey not shown to have been based upon
the original survey is inconclusive in determining boundaries
and will ordinarily yield to a resurvey based upon known
monuments and boundaries of the original survey.
12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Sections 64 through 66 state:
All parts of the description in a conveyance should be
allowed to stand if possible, and none of the calls should be
rejected if thev can be applied in any reasonable manner: it
is only in the case of an obvious mistake or where there is
such a contradiction or inconsistency as to render the
conveyance unintelligible that some of the calls are to be
rejected.
The general rule that in the construction of boundaries the
intention of the parties is the controlling consideration is
applied in determining the relative importance of conflicting
elements of description. The various rules adapted by the
court for construing and interpreting conflicts between calls
of description all have for their primary purpose the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties. Another basic
consideration is that those particulars of the description
which are uncertain and more liable to error and mistake
must be governed bv those which are more certain.
Where the calls for the location of boundaries to land- are
inconsistent, other things being equal, resort is to be had
first to natural objects or landmarks, next to artificial
monuments, then to adjacent boundaries (which are
considered a sort of monument), and thereafter to courses
and distances...
In determining boundaries of a tract of land, it is not
permissible to disregard any of the calls if they can be
applied and harmonized in any reasonable manner, but if
there is an actual contradiction between calls in the
description of land, so that they are irreconcilable, the
court mav reject or disregard the one which is false or
mistaken. Calls which cannot be complied with because they
are vague or repugnant may be rejected or controlled by
other material calls which are consistent and certain. An
inconsistent call should be discarded if thereby all the rest
of the calls are reconciled and the description perfected.
10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 71 p. 608 states:
Ancient fences used by a surveyor in his attempt to
reproduce an old survey are strong evidence of the location
of the original lines and, if they have been standing for
many years, should be taken as indicating such lines as
against the evidence of a survey which ignores such fences
and is based upon an assumed starting point. It is said that
a long-established fence is better evidence of actual
boundaries settled bv practical location than any survey
made after the monuments of the original survey have
disappeared. Accordingly, a fence erected on a surveyed
line shortly after the land has been surveyed may serve as a
monument to control courses and distances or a subsequent
survey after the stakes set out at the time of the original
survey have disappeared.
The weight of the relevant facts presented in this survey case is
determined by law. Therefore it is not within the discretion of a jury to weigh it.
C.

The jury was instructed to determine the credibility of witnesses when

credibility was not a relevant issue of fact. Since there were no factual disputes, this
instruction resulted in their weighing the credibility of the witnesses' arguments,
opinions, and conclusions.
Witness credibility was not at issue because the present location of all of the
boundary lines and fences was agreed upon, the deeds were clear and unambiguous and
were for the trial court to interpret, and the measurements agreed with each other.
The trial courts' instruction to the jury that they were the determiners of the
credibility of the witnesses was misleading and could only have resulted in a jury
decision based upon the witnesses' conclusions and opinions.
D.

The burden of proof should have rested with defendants.

The disputed

corner was the issue raised by defendants as an issue in support of their counterclaim.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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E.
judgment.

Plaintiffs and surrounding landowners are now burdened by a void
The judgment is void because, despite disclaimers of the trial judge, it

assumes jurisdiction over landowners who are not parties to this action, and will
require that they reform their deeds. The dissenting opinion correctly points out that
if the defendants' contention is adopted as to the location
of the obliterated monument, all property owners along
Sixth East Street must shift south 33 feet. Since this would
put boundary lines through existing houses, both parties
agree that this is not practical and that instead the
description of each property owner would have to be
reformed to conform to the defendants' contention as to the
location of the corner.
This reformation affects the numerous property owners in Block 34, only two of which
are parties to this action.

The rendering of a judgment which affects these property

owners without obtaining jurisdiction over them renders the judgment void.
Where the final decree in an action between adjoining
landowners to establish the true boundary between their lots
incorporated a new survey which established that the entire
section contained excess acreage, that the parcels belonging
to the parties should be apportioned on a pro rated basis,
and that a road through the center of the subdivision was
75 feet off of its actual true center line, the effect of the
enlargement of the section would be to redraw the
boundaries of each and every lot in the subdivision as well
as those of all parcels outside the subdivision but within the
section. All owners of affected lots and the citv. as holder
of an interest in the public roadway, would be indispensable
parties and the rendering of a final judgment without
jurisdiction over such parties would render the judgment
void and such jurisdiction failure would not be cured bv an
express declaration in the decree that the court had no
intent to adjudicate the rights of those not parties to the
action.
Johnston v. White-Spunner 342 So2d 754 (Ala 1977)

12
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POINT V.

THE SUPREME COURT IS ENTITLED TO OVERTURN THE JURY

VERDICT AND ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AS A MATTER OF
LAW, TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR TO ORDER A
NEW TRIAL.
The Court may overturn, grant judgment, or order a new trial where there is
manifest error or when the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence, is against
law, and is void.

The majority in this matter holds that:

Therefore, an insufficiency-of-the-evidence based challenge
to a denial of either motion (j.n.o.v. or a new trial) is
governed by one standard of review: we reverse only if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict.
The majority then summarily states, as did the trial judge and opposing counsel without
reference to a single specific fact in dispute, that:
During the three-day trial, each side supported its position
with deeds, maps, plats, and the testimony of several expert
surveyors who had independently retraced the original
surveys of the disputed parcels. The Hansens did not object
to the admission of any of the material evidence. There
were conflicts in the evidence...On the record, before us, we
cannot conclude that the evidence was so slight and
insubstantial that it cannot support the verdict for the
Stewarts.
The sufficiency of the evidence and whether there was any material issue have been
previously discussed. (See POINT I.)
But a new trial may also be granted even if the evidence
was sufficient to support the verdict, when the judge
believes the verdict was against the clear weight of the
evidence; or when procedural errors were committed (such
as erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, misconduct
of a party or counsel, etc.) which in the trial judge's
estimation may have seriously contaminated the proceeding.
(JAMES & HAZARD, Civil Procedure, Sections 7.20, .22(3d ed. 1985))
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12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 116 states:
New trials may be granted in cases involving questions of
the location of boundary lines where the questions are legal
in their character; and in proper cases new trial will be
granted on grounds dependent upon the weight of the
evidence.
Furthermore, it is clear that the verdict itself results in manifest error. If, as
Respondents contend, the very facts themselves (the deeds) would have to be reformed
if the verdict were to stand, it is clear that the verdict is wrong. Indeed, if all deeds
are reformed to refer to the new point defendants have located, the disputed boundary
should still be resolved in Plaintiffs' favor as the single boundary in question is not
ambiguous in the deeds. And since the intent of such reformation is to not alter the
lines of possession which have agreed with the deeds, the boundary Plaintiffs defend
would remain as they contend. Judgment in favor of defendants would result in chaos
and would not even resolve the disputed boundary.

Judgment in favor of plaintiffs

easily resolves all issues of law, alters no facts, and injures no one.
CONCLUSIONS
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Petitioners

respectfully request that the Court

determine 1) that there have been no questions of fact presented in this matter, 2)
that there is no evidence either factual or legal to support the verdict, 3) Plaintiffs
have now complied with the Court's standard of review, 4) the jury instruction's were
legally insufficient and resulted in prejudice to plaintiffs, and 5) that plaintiffs should
be granted a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of Aijgjjst, 1 9 ^ ^ tfllTL HANSEN ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS
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CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
ss.
)

BILL HANSEN, being first duly sworn, upon his oath certifies as follows:
1.

I am counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter.

2.

The Petition for Rehearing attached hereto is presented in good faith and

not for any delay.
DATED this 11th day of August, 1988.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of August, 1988.

Residing at: j
^u^e^\
My commission expires: (^ ^ ^ (# - Oy>
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
ss.
)

Evelyn Herbert, being first duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of WILFORD N. HANSEN JR., attorney for the
Plaintiffs/Appellants

herein; that she served the attached

Ppt.ition for Rehearing

;

.upon
the

npfPtirtants/Rpsnondflnts

envelope addressed to:

by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an

J a m e s C. J e n k i n s
JpnkinsfeEurbank
67 Fast. IPO North
Logan, Utah 84321
_and

deposited the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereof, in the United
States mail at Payson, Utah on the

H t h day of

August

t

1988.

Zoe^^AAiAir
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

H t h

day of A u g u s t

1988.

^^nn^^r

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Payson, Utah.
My commission expires November 20, 1988.

IOTARY PUBLIC

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

S

MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE
1.
The figure is a drawing to scale (1 inch - 165 ft.) of important features near
the disputed boundary located in Lot 12 Block 34. When various features have a
number near them, place in a circle, e.g. 6, the number refers to a note given
below. The abbreviation "cf." is used to indicate a cross-reference and "Ex."
followed by a number indicates a specific exhibit. "Trans. I, II or III" is the
abbreviation for trial transcript, volume I, II or III, as they are respectively
referenced herein.
2.
Southeast corner of Lot 12 Block 34. The location on the ground of the
Southeast Corner of Lot 12 was agreed to by all parties.
3.
The Northeast Corner of Lot 17 Block 8 was the next point north on the
ground that could easily be identified with a point on the Martineau plat. It
was the south boundary of a paved street. Its use was not objected to by
anyone.
4.
The distance from the Northeast corner of Lot 17 south to the north boundary
of a graveled lane called 800 South street is about 1350 feet by measurement (cf.
Trans. Vol. Ill p. 81 lines 1-4). The distance from the Southeast Corner of Lot
12 to the south boundary of the same lane is also about 1350 feet.
The
Martineau Plat calls for these distances to be equal, by showing them to be the
same length on the plat drawing. Thus the placement of the present 33 ft. wide
800 South street distributes the excess land equitably on both sides. This fact is
evident on the large aerial photograph (cf. Ex. 5).
5.
The location of this point with respect to both the Northeast Corner of Lot 12
and the Southeast Corner of Lot 12 is called for in two different deeds (cf. Ex.
15, 17). These deeds therefore specify the length of Lot 12. The length
specified is 400 ft. + 950.5 ft. « 1350.5 ft, in close agreement with Plaintiff's
Northeast Corner of Lot 12 location (cf. Trans. I p. 82 lines 8-12).
6.
The location of this point by measurement is 934 feet south of the Plaintiff's
Northeast Corner of Lot 12 (cf. Trans. Vol. Ill pp. 94, 95). Four deeds call for
this same distance (cf. Exs. 10 or 11, 13, 17, 22). This is a driveway of 1 rod
width, easily identified on the ground.
7.
The land at issue in this trial is shown by the cross-hatched area. It is north
of the fence whose position at the time of trial is roughly indicated by the line
with little tick marks.
The fence location might require a little explanation to avoid confusion. In
1969 when Hansen acquired his property from Miller there was no boundary
fence on roughly the west half of the disputed property, as testified by Hansen
( cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 35 lines 11-13). Stewart testified that there was a fence,
in poor condition (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 76 lines 2-9). Stewart caused the angular
fence present on the east side to be extended in a straight line to the west
boundary line in about 1977. Spiers surveyed the area in December 1978 while
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by the Howard
W. Hunter
J. Reuben Clark
School,
BYU. taken down, and
the straight fence
up (cf.
Ex.Law
7).Library,
Hansen
hadLaw
the
fence
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
after that Stewart had it put up again, but as indicated in the drawinc with it*

west end going to the North. Litigation was started and has taken several
years. Meanwhile, the fence has remained as indicated on the figure.
8.
The rectangular strip of land (40 ft. by 330 ft.) was deeded by Allen to Miller
before Allen deeded the parcel north of this strip to Stewart. The Allen to
Miller conveyance was by two deeds, on in 1957 and one in 1960 (cf. Exs. 14,
18). Here the location of the strip is derived from Plaintiff's Northeast Corner
of Lot 12 location.
9.
Location of the "Northeast Corner of Lot 12 Block 34 Plat A Providence Farm
Survey" as contended by Plaintiffs.
10. Location of the "Northeast Corner of Lot 12 Block 34 Plat A Providence Farm
Survey" as contended by Defendants.
11. The position of this 10 ft. strip of land on the ground is obvious. Its
description in deed (cf. Exs. 10 or 11) calls for the "Northeast Corner of Lot 12
Block 34" as its own Northeast Corner.
12. The points marked by X are the sites of steel surveyor's pegs testified to by
Hansen (cf. Trans. Vol HI p. 3 lines 6-18). Their location is perfectly consistent
with Plaintiff's Northeast Corner.
13. The deed calls for all the remaining parcels of land in Lot 12 are also
consistent with measurements in the field if the Northeast Corner of Lot 12 is
located as the Plaintiff's contend (cf. Trans. Vol. Ill pp. 66-67 and the exhibited
deeds).
14. The transparent overlay to the figure shows the positions of the boundaries in
Lot 12 as called for in the deeds using the Defendant's Northeast Corner of Lot
12.
The resulting entanglement is obvious.
Lots outside Lot 12 are also
involved. If the area labeled 8 is shifted south as on the overlay it will be in
Hansen's pond.
15. Note that there is no sign of the big platted 800 South street cast of 600 East
street, on the ground, even though it is prominent on the Martineau plat (cf. Ex.
5). The area that the street would occupy is already occupied by a large
church.
16.

cf. Trans. Vol. HI pp. 94, 95.

17.

cf. Trans. Vol HI p. 81 line 3.

18.

Stewart pasture (cf. Ex. 9).

19.

Hansen property (cf. Exs, 10, 11).

20.

Thayne properties (recently purchased by Larsen, cf. Exs. 16, 23).

21.
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22.

Former Gunnel property (cf. Ex. 22).

23. Plaintiffs purchased the disputed property (cf. map 7, 8) which adjoins
Defendants* property on the south from Maurine Miller (cf. Ex. 10 or 11), who
acquired the property from her husband Charles' estate. Charles Miller acquired
the property from Albern Allen by two separate Warranty Deeds in 1957 and 1960
(cf. Ex. 14, 18). Charles Miller acquired additional property (cf. map 19),
adjoining the two parcels, on the south and cast from Vernon Kreasie and Amy
Kreasie in 1956 and 1958 (cf. Ex. 13, 15, 19). Vernon Kreasie acquired the
property from John William Kreasie in 1943 (cf. Ex. 12).
24. Defendants purchased their pasture (cf. map 18) from Albern Allen in 1967 (cf.
Exs. 9, 21).
25. Charles Miller deeded lots to Henry Thain (cf. Exs. 16, 20, map 20) and J.B.
Gunnel (cf. Ex. 17, map 21).
26.

J.B. Gunnel deeded land in Lot 12 to Plaintiffs in 1970 (cf. Ex. 22, map 22).

27. Robert Larsen acquired the two Thain lots (cf. map 20) in 1983 (cf. Ex. 23).
The 10-foot strip belonging to Plaintiffs and located north of the Thain lots is
now being used by Larsen and its northeast corner is fenced. The northeast
corner of that fence was referred to at trial as the Larsen fence corner and is
at the northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34 as Plaintiffs claim (cf. Trans. Vol. I
p. 41 lines 2-10, also map northeast corner of Lot 12).
28. Two of the deeds arc double-tied to both the northeast corner of Lot 12,
Block 34 and the southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34, to-wit: Kreasie to
Miller, Miller to Gunnel (cf. Exs. 15, 17). These deeds specify the length of Lot
12 as 1350.5 feet, in close agreement with the location of the northeast corner
of Lot 12, Block 34 as Plaintiffs claim (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 53 lines 4-10 error
on lien 10 should read 1350.5 feet and Trans. Vol. Ill p. 94 lines 13-16). This
measurement is confirmed by Spiers, Naylor and Bott (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 82
lines 8-22, Trans. Vol. II p. 53 lines 4-10 and Trans. Vol. II p. 122 lines 20-25).
29. At the time Plaintiffs purchased their property, they discovered that the fence
along what Defendants claimed to be their southern boundary did not run in an
east/west direction as described in Plaintiffs' and Defendants' deeds (cf. Exs. 10,
11, 9, map 7), and was at the time only partially completed. It was later
completed in a line to the southwest (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 35 lines 11-13 and
Trans. Vol. II p. 80. line 12, p. 81 line 7) at an angle and encroached from 16
feet at its eastern-most point to 25 feet at its western-most point into
Plaintiffs' property. Defendants recently move the wets half of the fence in a
northwesterly direction to the point claimed by Plaintiffs to be the northwest
corner of the western-most Allen-to-Miller parcel (cf. Ex. 14 or 18, map 8
northwest corner of parcel).
30. Plaintiff Digitized
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and the northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Farms at the
point now claimed by Plaintiffs, the Larsen fence corner (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 19
line 12 and p. 20 line 16).
31. Plaintiff Wilford Hansen contacted Defendant John Stewart, who refused to
adjust the encroaching fence line and claimed that the fence was the actual
boundary (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 82, lines 9-13). Plaintiffs filed this action to
quiet title to their property.
32. Plaintiffs has the property resurveyed by Ken Spiers, a registered land
surveyor employed by Forsgren and Perkins (cf. Ex. 7) and by Clyde Naylor,
Utah County Surveyor and President of the Utah Chapter of the National Society
of Professional Engineers (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 5 lines 11-23 and Trans. Vol. II p.
6 lines 2-11). Both surveys show the northeast corner of Lot 12 Block 34 to be
at the point claimed by Plaintiffs, the Larsen fence corner (cf. Trans. Vol. I p.
41 line 17, p. 42 line 3 and Trans. Vol. II p. 8 lines 13-24). Both surveys show
that the lines of possession in Block 34 conform with the record titles, that is
deed descriptions, (including Defendants9 except for their southern boundary) in
Block 34 only if the northeast corner of Lot 12 Block 34 is at the Larsen fence
corner as Plaintiffs claim (cf. Trans. Vol. HI p. 66 lines 10-15, line 23, p. 67 line

o.
33. Defendants employed Randy Bott, a seminary teacher and part-time surveyor,
to resurvey the property (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 103 line 10 pc 106 line 5 and
Trans. Vol. II p. 107 lines 12-18). Bott determined that there were two corners:
one he called the "northeast corner of Block 34 as possessed", and a second he
called the "northeast corner of Lot 12 as measured" (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 47 line
23, p. 48 line 3). At trial, Bott testified that he found the first corner (located
at the Larsen fence corner as Plaintiffs claimed) by noting the lines of
possession established on the ground, using record title descriptions,
measurements and other evidence (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 147 lines 2-7, p. 125 lines
8-11). The second corner, 33 feet south of the first, he found by measuring the
length of the east line of Lot 12 indicated on the Martineau Plat, multiplying
the number of inches by the scale (number of inches x feet per inch • 1320
feet) (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 120 lines 20-21, p. 121 lines 4-6). Then, beginning at
the south line of Lot 12, assuming the actual north/south distance of Lot 12 to
be 1320 feet, Bott located the "north line of Lot 12 as platted", by measuring
1320 feet along the east boundary of Lot 12 (cf. Ex. 8, Trans. Vol. II p. 122 line
24, p. 123 line 2, p. 125 lines 5-6, p. 126 line 21). He proclaimed the northernmost point of said line to be the northeast corner of Lot 12 as platted (cf.
Trans. Vol. II p. 126 lines 21, 24-25).
34. Naylor's uncontroverted testimony was that the measured distance from the
only two identifiable monuments that exist in the area along the west side of
600 East street (the monuments at the southeast corner of Lot 12 and at the
south boundary of 600 South street) was 2, 733 feet, rather than the distance of
2, 706 feet suggested by the scale of the Martineau Plat (cf. Ex. 1, Trans. Vol.
Ill p. 80 line 17, p. 81 line 4). This shows that the Martineau Plat is not a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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35. Hickman testified that the Martineau Plat was drawn primarily for tax
assessment purposes (cf. Trans. Vol. Ill p. 31, line 23, p. 32 line 3). Bott,
Naylor and Hickman testified that the Martineau Plat was created as an office
survey or paper survey as were subsequent plats (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 135 lines
19-24, Trans. Vol. HI p. 32 lines 4-12, Trans. Vol. Ill p. 55 lines 6-12).
36. Bott, Naylor and Hickman testified that if the northeast corner of Lot 12 is
located as Defendants claim, Plaintiffs', Defendants', Larsens* and other deeds
tied to the northeast corner (north line) of Lot 12 (and by implication the deeds
in the other lots of Block 34 in line with the north boundary of Lot 12) will of
necessity need to be reformed and/or the long-standing lines of possession
relocated (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 130 lines 1-6, Trans. Vol. II p. 36 line 3, p. 37
line 20, Trans. Vol. Ill p. 67 line 17, p. 68 line 25, Trans. Vol. Ill p. 75 line 23,
p. 76 line 22, Trans. Vol. HI p. 33 lines 4-20).
37. It is undisputed that there is merely a partial gravel lane, approximately 33
feet wide, beginning at 600 East street and extending westerly along the north
boundary of Lots 12, 11, 10 and 9 at the location indicated as 800 South street
on the Martineau Plat. There is not evidence that a 66-foot road has ever
existed at that location (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 44 lines 6-12, p. 10 lines 20-24).
38. No evidence was presented that there has ever been any dispute over lines of
possession or record titles in the area except along the disputed south boundary
of Defendants pasture.
Defendants now propose to disrupt the lines of
possession and record titles (deed descriptions) of the entire area to establish
the south boundary of their pasture as they claim, an unconscionable result (cf.
Trans. Vol. II p. 38 lines 14-20).
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